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IS EQUITY DECADENT?

IS EQUITY DECADENT?f
By

INA

PAPER

WILLIAm

F.

WALSH*

in an early volume of the Columbia Law Review,

entitled "The Decadence of Equity,"' Dean Pound asserted
in substance that the development of modern equity into an
established system of rules, applied very much as are rules at law,
has brought into operation a process of decadence of equity as
a living system of discretionary law. He gives as the agencies
bringing about this decadence, first, the establishment in equity
of the doctrine of case-law precedents resulting in the crystallization of modem equity, and second, the merger of law and equity
by adoption of equitable actions and defenses at law, and by codes
and other statutes merging legal and equitable procedure. He
regarded it as inevitable that equity's development as a system of
law with established principles and rules must necessarily destroy
it a's a system of law based on the exercise of judicial discretion.
He cited several cases as illustrating decadence in equity: among
others, a Nebraska case in which the higher court reversed the
lower court's enforcement of an equitable mortgage of chattels
to be subsequently acquired, holding the mortgage void by applying
the legal rule, ignoring the controlling equitable rule-;2 and another Nebraska case which held that creditors in following money
of their debtor used fraudulently in the purchase of property
would be restricted to the purchase price and legal interest thereon
though the property had greatly increased in value, again applying
the legal principle in disregard of the resulting trust and the
equitable doctrine that the dishonest trustee is charged with any
profits made by him in the fraudulent use of trust funds though
such profits exceed interest at the legal rate.3 He classified
these cases as illustrating the disappearance of equitable rules as
a result of code merger.
It must be said, however, that these cases and all like them are
*Professor of Law, New York University.
fIThe substance of this paper was delivered as an address before the
Equity Round Table of the Association of American Law Schools at
Chicago, December, 1937.
21(1905) 5 Col. L. Rev. 20.
1amphere v. Lowe, (1873) 3 Neb. 131. The same kind of mistake
was also made in Brown v. Neilson, (1900) 61 Neb. 765 and Townsend v.
Allen,
(1901) 62 Kan. 311, 62 Pac. 1008.
3
Hart v. Dogge, (1889) 27 Neb. 256.
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rather illustrations of mistaken law applied by courts in apparent
ignorance of the law involved, in no way indicating any decadence
of equity. These and other cases cited as indicating that code
merger causes the courts to overlook obvious equitable rights furnish no excuse for the judicial ignorance and incompetence which
they illustrate. Law and equity are simply brought together by
code merger so that all relief, legal and equitable, may be applied
in a single action without any change either of law or equity,
except that the equitable rule must prevail in case of conflict, as
in the case cited of an equitable mortgage of property to be
acquired in the future, void at law because of the non-existence of
the property at the time of the making of the mortgage.
As illustrating the point that equitable principles become hard
and fast and are applied like legal rules, Dean Pound referred to
the adoption at law of equitable estoppel, and to cases in which
equitable doctrines have been applied by courts under the merged
procedure so as to result in positive injustice, losing sight of the
principle generally understood and applied by such courts that
equitable relief may always be withheld or granted on special terms
in the discretion of the court whenever justice demands it. But
surely these are again illustrations of failure on the part of the
courts either to understand or to apply law and equity combined
under code merger. The court in every such case is a court of
equity as well as a court of law, and must apply equitable principles exactly as though no merger had been made. Mistakes of
this kind call for a better education of bench and bar in what code
merger means. They cannot fairly be taken as decadence in equity,
which is not changed in substance by code merger.
Dean Pound made clear that he was not condemning code
merger. The moral of these cases he said was that we must be
vigilant, we must fight for our equity so that law may be tempered
with equity. The way to eliminate these mistakes is by teaching
equity from the standpoint of the merged system so that misapprehension and misunderstanding of what the merger accomplishes may be finally and completely removed.
WHAT ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF EQUITY?

I am convinced that equity's function is much broader than the
modification of the harsh application of legal rules by the use of
judicial discretion, and that Seldon's characterization of early
equity as varying with the individual chancellor's ideas of justice
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and reason, without the restraining influence of recognized and
established principles, illustrated by his famous reference to the
length of the chancellor's foot, has been too readily acquiesced in
by modern scholars.' We have very little actual material on the
development of equity in Chancery prior to 1391. A very considerable part of the business of the Chancellor's Court from
1350, the date of the Ordinance of London which may be taken
roughly as fixing the date when the Chancellor's Court began to
function regularly, down to 1391 and later, consisted of the granting of relief in cases of outrage committed by powerful lords in
clear violation of the common law, and these cases involved no
element of equity in the modern sense. No doubt there were
many instances of relief of a purely equitable character involving
appeals to the chancellor's conscience during that short period of
forty years, but we have very little evidence of the way in which
the principle of judicial discretion was applied during that period.
The 300,000 petitions to the Chancellor preserved from about
1391 down through the 'following century give us an abundance
of evidence of equity's development during the fifteenth century,
the earliest period of which we have definite knowledge of how the
Chancellor exercised judicial discretion in granting equitable relief.
During this period the system of uses by means of which the
more onerous burdens and abuses of feudalism were avoided, was
developed in the Chancellor's Court. A system of property law
which to a considerable extent displaced the feudal law of property
of the common law courts was developed by the Chancellor, a
quite definite system of law based on recognized and established
principles, refuting very completely the position taken by Seldon.5
4Blackstone, describing Chancery at the end of the fifteenth century,
said that "no regular judicial system at that time prevailed in the court;
but the suitor when he thought himself aggrieved found a desultory and
uncertain remedy, according to the private opinion of the Chancellor."
3 Blackstone, Comm. 53.

Professor Holdsworth says: "In early days

there were no fixed principles upon which the Chancellors exercised their

equitable jurisdiction. The rule applied depended very much upon the ideas
as to right and wrong possessed by each Chancellor. Hence there is a
considerable amount of truth in Seldon's well known aphorism. 'Equity is
a roguish thing. For law we have a measure. . . . Equity is according to

the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower.
so is equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the
measure a Chancellor's foot."' 1 Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. L. (1935) 467, 468.
5
See Walsh, Equity (1930) 18-22, for a brief review of this development, citing Digby, Hist. L. Real Prop., (5th ed. 1897) 326, 327, 328;

Huston, Enforcement of Equitable Degrees (1915)
Maitland, Equity (1932)

117, 120.

94, 95, 99, 100;

Prof. Maitland said, Maitland, Equity

(1932) 27, 28, as to the avoidance of feudal rules by the system of uses:
"You will see that the success of this scheme would have been marred if the
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The extensive development during this period of equitable relief
in contract where debt or covenant would not lie, so brilliantly
developed by Professor Barbourr and being second only to uses
in scope and importance, is almost equally potent as a refutation
of Seldon's position. In this first formative period of equity's
development a system of relief in cases of fraud was worked onut,
not only in cases of specialties procured by fraud but also in other
cases of simple fraud in which no relief could be had at law.
Relief from penalties and forfeitures, enforcement of assignments
of rights of action, recovery in specie of chattels of unique value
and relief from mistake, are some of the more important additional
fields of equitable relief initiated and developed during this
period," all of which together constituted a quite definite body of
law developed and applied by a single highly organized court,
based on a precedent of principles rather than of mere decisions.
A very considerable part of the principles which dominate equitable
relief today were thus initiated and to a considerable degree developed in the fifteenth century, giving exceedingly scanty support
to Seldon's aphorism relating to the chancellor's foot.
No doubt the discretionary power of the chancellor or judge
in equity is a fundamental characteristic of equitable relief. My
contention is that this is just as true today as it always has been,
and that in the early period, very much as at the present time,
he established and followed definite principles which go back to
the fifteenth century and which include the most important of the
principles under which equity is administered today. Of course it
is true that in modern equity there has been a more conscious
reliance on precedent than in the earlier period, and the rules under
which equity acts have been greatly developed and systematized.
Nevertheless it is a fundamental principle in the practical application of these rules that the court has a discretionary power to
courts of law had compelled the feoffees to fulfil the honorable understanding
by virtue of which they had acquired the land. If they had begun to say 'after
all this land is the feoffor's land the feoffees are a mere screen or the
feoffees are merely the feoffor's agents,' then the whole scheme would have
broken down-wardship, marriages, forfeitures, escheats would have followed as a matter of course."
6
Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity, (1914)
4 Oxford Studies in Legal History. See also 5 Holdsworth, Hist. Eg. L.
(1935) 294-297.
7See sketch of the development of the action at law on the case for
fraud, preceded by relief in equity in the fifteenth century in fraud cases
by way of restitution, there being no relief at law at that time, in Walsh,
Equity (1930) 492, 493, note 8.
sSee Walsh, Equity (1930) 25-27, and authorities there cited.
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withhold relief or to grant it only on special terms fixed by the
court where under the special facts of the particular case justice
demands that the relief usually given be withheld or be granted
only on such special terms. What evidence have we of a purely
discretionary equiti even in this period of equity's earliest development?
I do not think that we can fairly say that equity exists simply
to grant discretionary relief in hard cases at law. Its function
is very much broader. It may fairly be regarded as the spiritual
and reforming influence of the law, correcting deficiencies in the
law where legal relief is inadequate, and leading the way to
reforms in the law. Thus equity's action in the development of
uses practically eliminated most of the obsolete doctrines of
feudalism after feudalism ceased to exist as an active social and
governmental system. This led directly to the enactment of the
statute of uses, under which the modern conveyance by deed took
the place of conveyances by livery of seisin, permitting the creation
of future executory estates impossible under the old law, and the
statute of wills Which restored the power at law to devise land.
The enforcement of contracts in the fifteenth century by the
Chancellor's Court where debt or covenant would not lie was
followed by the development of assumpsit at law, starting in the
latter part of the fifteenth century. Is there any doubt that this
extensive jurisdiction in equity led the common law judges to
work out similar relief at law, by using the action on the case
based on the supposed deceit involved in the breach of contract,
resulting quickly in the development of assumpsit? Chancery gave
up this jurisdiction after the new action of assumpsit gave adequate
relief at law, retaining jurisdiction in specific performance cases
where damages at lav was inadequate. In much the same way
and for like reasons the granting of relief by equity in cases of
fraud referred to above was followed by the development at law
of the action on the case for fraud and deceit.9 The abandonment
of equitable relief in these cases after the remedy at law had
developed followed as in cases of simple contract.
9
The ancient writ of deceit at law up to the latter part of tie fourteenth century was limited to cases of fraudulent use of legal process. 3
Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. L. (1935) 407. Instances of deceit on the case
in 1367 and thereafter based on breach of varranty as to quality, really
cases of contract brought in the form of deceit, are cited in 3 Holdsworth,
Hist. Eng. L. (1935) 407, 408. For the subsequent development of case for
deceit based on false representations knowingly made see S Holdsworth.
Hist. Eng. L. 417, note 1.
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The development at law in the eighteenth century of implied
assumpsit based on the fiction of a promise implied by law to
prevent unjust enrichment, including cases of contribution between cosureties and copartners, was really the adoption at law of
that part of equitable relief in which the fiction of an implied trust
is used where justice requires it, the law using the implied promise
just as equity uses the implied trust as the tool by which justice
is done."0 In these cases equity in most states retains a concurrent
jurisdiction.
That choses in action of all kinds were not assignable at law
prior to the seventeenth century is a matter requiring no elaboration. The Chancellor enforced such assignments of choses in
action not purely personal from the fifteenth century onward,
simply because -justice demanded such relief and no relief could
be had at law. Finally in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries the law couts found a way to incorporate into the law
this form of equitable relief by the use of the fiction of an implied
power to collect in the assignee in the name of the assignor.
The fiction has been dropped today, andthe assignee is everywhere
recognized as the real owner of the chose as he always has been
in reality since equity established his right in the fifteenth century. 1
The lien theory of mortgages is a direct result of the carrying
over into the law of the principles established by the Chancellor's
Court in the early part of the seventeenth century. Equity,
though recognizing the purely technical legal title of the mortgagee,
enforced the real ownership of the mortgagor by establishing
his equity of redemption, and by charging the mortgagee as a
trustee if he exercised his legal right to take over possession of
the mortgaged property and collected the rents and profits. Equity
treated the legal title and right of possession as existing in the
mortgagee only for the purpose of establishing and protecting his
'0Walsh, Equity (1930) 90-91, 495 (as to constructive trusts in fraud
cases enforced at law by actions in quasi-contract to prevent unjust enrichment).
"On assignability of choses at law see Ames, Disscisin of Chattels.
3 Sel. Essays Anglo-Am. Legal Hist. (1909) 580, 581; 1 Beale, Conflict of
Laws, (1935) sec. 152; Holdsworth, History of Choses in Action, (1920)
33 Harv. L. Rev. 997-1003. In their enforcement in equity in the fifteenth
century see Barbour, History of Contract in Early Eng. Equity, (1914)
4 Oxford Studies in Legal Hist. 108; Cook, Assignability of Choses in
Action, (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 821, and note. On the adoption at law
of the doctrine in equity see Cook, Assignability of Choses in Action, (1916)
29 Harv. L. Rev. 816, and (1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 449; Williston, Is the
Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?, (1917) 30
Harv. L. Rev. 97, and (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 822.
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security for payment of the mortgage debt. The lien theory now
prevailing in the great majority of the states establishes at law
the ownership of the mortgagor, and the security of the mortgagee
as a lien. In the remaining states the legal ownership of the
mortgagor is recognized at law for most purposes. In so far as
the lien theory has not been adopted in these states law and equity
are in conflict, with the confusion and positive injustice which
must necessarily result from opposing rules relating to the same
12
matter in the same sovereign state.
The reforming influence of equity in the development of the
law is illustrated also by the rule initiated in equity and subsequently adopted at law that the contents of a lost or destroyed written
instrument may be established by secondary evidence,"3 and by the
adoption at law of the equitable rule that a contract providing
for a penalty will not be enforced, the plaintiff being limited to
his actual damages.. 4 The distinction between provisions in contracts for liquidated damages and for penalties illustrates this
rule taken from -equity by the lav courts. Equitable defenses to
specialties which were among the first cases in which the Chancellor directly intervened to change the rights and obligations
of the parties at law because reason and justice demanded it, were
not adopted into the law except in the defense of illegality' 5
until modem statutes provided for the setting up of equitable
defenses generally in law actions. Equitable estoppel is another
equitable doctrine now generally regarded as fully adopted by
courts of law, in non-code as well as code states."
In all these cases equity initiated important reforms in the
law which reason and conscience demanded, preventing the enforcement of the conflicting legal rule by in personam control of the
1-For a detailed treatment of the development of equitable jurisdiction
over mortgages see Walsh, Mortgages (1934) 6-13. On the development of
the lien theory see ibid., 19-33, and authorities there cited.
"sUnderwood v. Staney, (1666) 1 Ch. Cas. 77; Kelley v. Riggs, (1794)

2 Root (Conn.) 126; Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defenses,
Lectures on Legal Hist. (1913) 104.
this development in equity see 1 Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction.
-4For
(1845) 630; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 91, the statutes (8 and 9 Win. III cii. 11, sec.
8 (1697), and 4 Anne Ch. 16, secs. 12, 13 (1705)) providing for recovery on
bonds of only the actual damages made the rule the same at law as in
equity. Later cases extended this rule at law as in equity to all actions
on contracts. Astley v. Weldon, (1801) 2 Bos. & P. 346. See 2 Williston,
Contracts (1936) secs. 775-779; Lloyd, Penalties and Forfeitures, (1915)
29 Harv. L. Rev. 117.
1"Collins v. Blantern, (1767) 2 Wils. 341.
26See Hinton, Equitable Defenses, (1919) 18 Mich. L. Rev. 726, citing
Kirk v. Hamilton, (1880) 102 U. S. 68, 26 L. Ed. 79.
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parties whenever that was necessary. That the law in the broad
sense is and always has been made up of law and equity combined
cannot reasonably be denied. That the true law in all these cases
of conflict was the equitable, not the legal, rule is equally unassailable. That the law courts followed so extensively the lead of
equity establishes definitely that equity not only operated to relieve
in cases of hardship, by the exercise of judicial discretion, but
actually reformed the existing law by the application of broad
principles of social justice which, to the extent which I have outlined, the law courts adopted as part of the common law.
DOES THE MERGER OF LAW AND EQUITY UNDER MODERN CODES
AND OTHER STATUTES CAUSE DECADENCE IN MODERN EQUITY?

The answer to this question is that never has equity more
effectually led the way in the law's growth than during the period
which has followed the merger of law and equity. From this
point of view, by far the most important advance made by equity
in the last hundred years has been code merger. The law of the
land is no longer made up of two distinct systems competing with
each other in many important fields. The scandal of two opposing
rules applying to the same situation in the same sovereign state,
and the waste and delay involved in the necessity of an additional
suit in equity to restrain the enforcement of the legal rule, or in
securing equitable relief in addition to legal relief, have been
eliminated, as has been the necessity of starting a new action if
the plaintiff was mistaken as to the form of relief to which he
was entitled. When equity now extends specific relief to cover
a constantly broadening field the new law so established becomes
at once a part of the general law applied and enforced in all
courts and in all actions, since in every such case every court is
a court of both law and equity and every such action is both legal
and equitable. There is no longer any occasion for the adoption
at law of equitable rules. They become at once part of the
single system made up of law and equity combined.
There are, of course, many illustrations of error arising out
of misapprehension and misunderstanding of what code merger
means and of what it accomplishes. The cases discussed by Dean
Pound in his article in the Columbia Law Review are all of them
illustrations of this. Probably the most glaring mistakes of this
kind are the cases decided in New York, discussed by Dean Clark
in a later article in the Columbia Law ReviewIT In Jackson v.
17

CIark, The Union of Law and Equity, (1925)

25 Col. L. Rev. 1.
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Strong,"' in an action for an accounting based on the theory of
a joint venture, the answer set up that instead of a joint venture
between the parties the defendant had employed the plaintiff to
aid him for the reasonable value of his services. Judgment for
the plaintiff for such reasonable value was set aside, the court
saying:
"Where . . . it appears that there never was any substantial
cause for equitable interference, the court will not retain the action
and grant purely legal relief but will dismiss the complaint ...
The inherent and fundamental difference between actions at law
and suits in equity cannot be ignored."
This was dictum, as the complaint was not dismissed but a new
trial was ordered. On the new trial there could be no question of
the plaintiff's right to amend his complaint so as to set up his
action at law, the only difficulty with the original judgment in his
favor having been his failure to have the complaint amended to
conform with the proof on the trial, a technical matter of pleading.
Though this dictum was followed in two or three cases in the
lower courts, 19 subsequent decisions of the court of appeals, following the law long settled by prior cases, establish conclusively
that in any case brought for equitable relief, if it is found that
the suitor is entitled on the facts as pleaded and proved only to
legal relief, the court will give him a judgment for damages instead of the equitable relief which he sought.20
In the great majority of the states, as in England, statutory
merger of law and equity is an accomplished fact. The movement
to establish such merger in the federal courts is so far advanced
that its eventual success cannot be far in the future. In most of
the non-code states a very considerable degree of merger exists
under statutes providing for equitable defenses in law actions,
and providing for the easy transfer from equity to law courts and
vice versa of actions brought in the wrong court. Nevertheless in
the many cases in which both legal and equitable relief is required
in the same controversy, separate actions are still necessary in those
states, the establishment of equitable defenses in law actions
in those states is beset with confusion and uncertainty, and the
maintenance of separate courts of equity involves considerable
added expense. There is every reason to expect that code merger
"s(1917) 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N. E. 512.
IgSee discussion of these cases in Clark, The Union of Law and Equity.

(1925)0 25 Col. L. Rev. 1.
These cases are cited and discussed Walsh. Equity 111, and notes.
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in the federal courts will be followed by similar action in the remaining non-code states.
It is therefore necessary that the bench and bar of the future
shall have a thorough understanding of what this merger means.
Every division of equity should be regarded from this point of
approach. The old equity as a competing system often in conflict
with the law continues to exist only in that narrow residuum
which I have already indicated, and there is every reason to believe that that residuum will eventually disappear.
The best case illustrating code merger of law and equity is
Hahl v. S11go, 21 a New York court of appeals case decided in 1901.
The plaintiff obtained a judgment in ejectment to recover his land
covered by the defendant's encroaching wall. The sheriff refused
to enforce execution because removal of the wall by him was impracticable. Instead of asking and securing a mandatory judgment in the alternative requiring the defendant to remove the wall,
the plaintiff moved for a court order requiring such removal which
was denied. Thereafter in an action at special term brought to
compel removal of the wall, the court held that the plaintiff had
already had his day in court, when he should have sought and
secured the judgment requiring the defendant to remove the wall.
The original action in ejectment was also an action in equity in
which he was bound to seek any equitable relief to which he was
entitled. Not having done so in the former action, he was barred
from maintaining another action for this relief. This doctrine
makes code merger a real thing, not a pretense.
Law and equity are simply brought together in code merger,
without changing equity and without changing law, except that
in the cases of former conflict the equity rule necessarily displaces
the legal rule. In the first Nebraska case discussed by Dean
Pound, the controlling equitable rule that a valid mortgage of
the after-acquired property arose when the property was acquired
should have been applied by the court, instead of the legal rule
which had been displaced by the opposing doctrine of equitable
mortgages. In actions for injunctions against waste, trespass,
nuisance, unfair competition or other injuries to business, specific
performance and generally all other cases in which specific relief is
given to enforce and protect legal rights, damages will also be
given in most of the non-code states in order to eliminate the need
of another action at law, though a separate action for damages may
21(1901)

169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135.
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be brought therefor at the plaintiff's election; but equity will not
retain the action for that purpose if the plaintiff is not entitled
to any equitable relief. In the code states, every such action is
both at law and in equity, and complete relief, legal and equitable,
must be given by the court which is a court of law as well as a
court of equity, and the plaintiff will not be permitted another distinct action for damages, which he must recover if at all in the injunction suit. If on the facts proved and pleaded the plaintiff is not
entitled to any relief in equity, but is entitled to-damages at law,
the court is a court of law bound to award such damages, after
trial by jury, to which the defendant is entitled if he demands it,
and the fact that the prayer for relief does not include damages
is not controlling if the facts pleaded and proved establish his
22
right to damages.
Equitable defenses do not become legal defenses under code
merger or under statutes in non-code states providing that they
may be set up in law actions. Since in code states every action
is both legal and equitable, so that complete relief of both kinds
may be given as the facts pleaded and established may require, it
is difficult to understand why in New York and some other code
states it was deemed necessary to provide expressly by amending
statutes for such defenses. The elimination of the suits in equity
formerly necessary to establish such defenses and to restrain enforcement of the action at law was one of the primary purposes of
code merger. That code merger is as yet not fully understood is
illustrated -by decisions in New York and some of the other states,
contrary to the rule prevailing in most of the code states, that
equitable defenses must be tried to the jury with the other issues,
not to the court.23 These are quite obvious cases of the survival
of the confusion and lack of understanding of code merger. Certainly no change should be made in the form of trial by making
the defense available in the jury action. It is still an equitable issue to be disposed .of according to the principles of equity, and
22

For a discussion of the leading cases on these matters see Walsh,
Equity (1930) 107-116, with frequent references to Clark, Code Pleading
(1928)
23

- King v. Internat. Lumber Co., (1914) 156 Minn. 494, 195 N. W.
451; Citizens Trust Co. v. Goring, (1921) 288 Mo. 505, 232 S. W. 996;
Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. A. A. Anderson & Co., (1925) 239 N. Y. 285,
146 N. E. 381. These cases admit that equitable counterclaims and equitable issues where both legal and equitable relief are sought are triable to the
court. See additional cases cited in Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 63, note 73,
also ibid., 61, 62, note 70, for a long list of cases from many code states
holding that the trial of equitable defenses in these cases is to the court
as equitable issues.
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the form of trial continues unchanged exactly as do the substantive
doctrines involved. This is all in entire accord with code merger.
Law issues are tried to the jury, and equity issues are tried to the
court without change, but combining both in the same trial, saving
the expense and delay of separate trials and eliminating conflict
between law and equity.
RESULTS OF THE MERGER OF LAW AND EQUITY

I need not repeat what I have already said on the merger of
the two systems by the adoption at law of equity rules through the
development of assumpsit, of the action on the case in fraud and
deceit, the assignability of choses in action not purely personal,
the lien theory of mortgages, the refusal to enforce penalties in
contract cases, and the adoption at law of the principle of equitable
estoppel. The enrichment of the law by these developments is
self-evident. Allowing the recovery of damages as incident to
the action in equity for an injunction against waste, continuous
and repeated trespasses and nuisances has resulted in the bringing
of these actions almost exclusively in equity. Complete relief is
secured in a single action, including an injunction restraining
further wrongful acts and the damages sustained up to the granting of the injunction. The separate action at law has become almost obsolete in these cases. Merger to that extent prevails by
decision in most of the non-code states. In others, as in New
Jersey. damages as such may not be recoverable unless they can
be brought under some principle of equitable accounting. In code
states no such question can arise.
Code merger ends the former extensive jurisdiction in equity
to restrain actions at law so that equities may be enforced, as well
as suits in equity for temporary injunctions in ejectment and other
suits at law. Since the litigant is always in equity under the merged
system, he may secure his injunction pendente lite in the principal
action, without the bringing of a separate suit in equity.
In trespass and nuisance cases the old rule that a disputed
question of title to the land involved, or a dispute as to the existence of a legal nuisance at law, must first be settled by an action
at law before equity will grant an injunction, except as an injunction pendente lite, has been eliminated in code states. Since the
court is a court of both law and equity bound to determine all
questions, legal and equitable, involved in the controversy, there
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can be no question in code states that this ancient relic of a former
time, which never had any valid justification, no longer exists.2'
A few additional situations may be referred to very briefly
as illustrating how code merger operates to apply the correcting
operation of equitable principles directly to the controversies involved, in effect changing the legal rule. A parol reservation of
fixtures, crops, growing trees, dead and down timber or other
parts of the realty, will not be allowed to modify a deed. Since
the deed may be reformed in equity to give effect to the actual
intent of the parties, correcting the mistake arising out of the
omission of the reservation from the deed, in an action at law
either -by or against the grantor turning on his right to the things
so reserved, he may plead and prove facts on which equity would
"reform" the deed, in that way defeating the legal rule. In many
cases of unilateral mistake in contract the party affected by the
mistake will be affirmatively relieved in equity from liability on
the contract if the other party has not changed his position, a
serious interference with the common law doctrine of mutual
assent which may be set up in an action at law on the contract.
Of course, under code merger mutual mistake may always be set
up as an equitable defense or counterclaim in the law action, or
it may be set up by the plaintiff in an action to enforce the contract which the parties really intended. In an action of ejectment
to enforce a forfeiture of a tenancy for nonpayment of rent or
taxes, the breach involving merely the payment of money, the
defendant may defend by paying the amount due with interest and
costs, since equity relieves him from the forfeiture in such cases.
These are merely samples of the effect of code merger on actions
at law in the many cases in which the application of equitable rules
changes the result of the action. The Nebraska case of a mortgage of goods to be subsequently acquired, discussed by Dean
Pound, in the article already referred to, is simply another illustration, the equitable mortgage doctrine disposing of the case and
overthrowing the legal rule, if the court had known and applied the
controlling law.
Failure to understand and apply code merger was responsible
for the continuation of the rule that a judgment at law must be
recovered and an execution thereon be returned unsatisfied before
an action can be brought in equity by the creditor, to set aside
a conveyance in fraud of creditors. This has been corrected by
24For the trespass cases on this question see Walsh, Equity (1930) 164;

for the nuisance cases, ibid., 176, 177.
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the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, now adopted in New
York and other states.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF MODERN EQUITY TO THE LAW'S GRowru

Next in importance to the merger of law and equity as a factor
in the development of modern law generally must be placed the
development of equitable protection of business rights and interests. The rights involved are of course legal rights. Wrongs of
this kind interfere directly with a man's right to make a living,
and the recovery of damages periodically at law is so obviously
inadequate as a substitute for this right that this development of
the law has been almost exclusively in equity, the relief granted
including an injunction restraining the wrong and the awarding
of damages sustained up to the granting of the decree.
There is no space here for more than the most perfunctory
reference to this development. It is a recent development. A beginning was made in a trade-mark case decided in England in
the latter part of the eighteenth century. One of the earliest
cases of this kind in the United States was decided in 1844. From
these small beginnings the law of unfair competition and protection of business rights has developed into one of the most extensive and important divisions of modern law. Most of this development has been made in the last fifty years, and much that is
most significant has been relatively recent. That trade-marks,
trade names and business secrets are not property in themselves
and are of value only as incidents of the business with which they
are associated, and that the tort involved in their wrongful use
is the stealing of that business by unfair competition, is law established by a great number of modern cases. 25 In cases of direct
injuries to business the determination of what is and what is not
unfair competition has been a difficult problem involving the
balancing of competition essential to business practice as against
destruction of business interests by unfair means. The question
of what is fair and unfair in business practice has been determined
by applying the test of the average man, very much as in cases
of negligence and nuisance. The element of fairness is peculiarly
within the sphere of equitable action. But the judge in equity
assumes no arbitrary power in these cases based on his individual
ideas of right and wrong. He expresses or seeks to express a
standard of right which is measured by the general standards of
25

For a review of the cases on these topics see Walsh, Equity (1930)
223-234.
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the community, in terms of the average person, so that the greatest
freedom of action may be given to every person in his business
without serious danger of its destruction by the unfair practices
of others.
Cases involving the relations between capital and labor show the
most striking development of law accomplished by equity in modem
times. What is fair and unfair in the competition between employers and employed is determined in accordance with the
standard of the average man. We have seen earlier narrow cases
sharply limiting the rights of labor to assert its rights by collective action gradually giving way to more enlightened views. We
have seen the dissenting opinions of Holmes and Brandeis finally
becoming the law in most states. It seems a pity that this development should have been carried to such extremes by statutes such
as the Norris-La Guardia Act and similar statutes in many states.
The best interests of labor are tied up with the best interests of
capital. At the time these statutes were enacted labor had attained
a recognition of its rights in equity in most states, and even the
federal courts were not far behind. Holmes and Brandeis were
winning over the Supreme Court to the broad views of social
progress involved in collective bargaining. It is exceedingly
doubtful if the interference of politicians by the enactment of these
extremely partisan statutes will be as beneficial to labor as would
a more orderly development through decisions. There can be
little doubt that the public interest has suffered through this inter21
ference with normal development of equitable relief.
The development in equity of the protection by injunction of
public or social rights is also a product of modern equity. Injunctions against public nuisances, usually in the form of purprestures
interfering with navigable waters or other public ways or places,
were exceedingly few prior to the nineteenth century. They were
based on the protection of property rights of the state, though the
real purpose was to protect the rights of enjoyment of the public
in their use. It was a short and easy step to the restraint of public
nuisances dangerous to the physical health of the community
though no property right was involved, fully established under the
modem cases. The next step was to restrain as public nuisances
the carrying on of any activity which, seriously endangered public
26Walsh, Equity (1930) 238-250, contains a review of the development
of labor law, with a discussion and citation of the more important cases.
See ibid., 251-261, as to the superiority of the courts over politicians in
settling these problems.
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morals. Prevention by injunction is so superior in these cases to
punishment under the criminal law after the harm to the public
has been done, as to make self-evident the inadequacy of the remedy
at law. Equity does not interfere with punishment of the offender
by the criminal law in these cases. The purpose is to prevent irreparable injury to the public by restraining the wrongdoer. The
latent power of equity to shape and develop new law on a higher
plane of reason and conscience, and with an increased effectiveness
to meet human needs has no better expression than in this develop27

ment.

The power of equity to shake off the incubus of an outworn
or mistaken doctrine is illustrated by developments in the later
cases in which the courts of several states have questioned the
slogan: Equity protects property rights only. In the usual cases
of purely personal torts such as assaults, negligence and false
imprisonment, injunctions are not necessary or expedient. But
wherever the remedy of damages is definitely inferior to prevention of the wrong, as it very clearly is in threatened or continued
libels published maliciously to injure their victim, there seems to
be no good reason why equity should not intervene. In England
injunctions against libels are granted where the facts establish the
libel and the absence of truth or privilege as defenses so completely that a verdict to the contrary would be overruled. The
American cases have not as yet followed this lead, and have refused to act unless an injury to business is directly involved, such
as a malicious libel as to the validity of a patent, or the malicious
use of libels of the plaintiff's business by employees in a strike.
The step forward to the position of the English cases is a short
one and may come at any time.
The courts of several states have declared that they would protect purely personal rights by injunction where damages would be
inadequate and the remedy would be expedient and effective, and
in some cases they have enjoined interferences with purely personal rights. Enough progress has been made to justify the discarding of the doctrine that property rights only will be protected
in equity, leaving the courts free to extend specific relief here as
in other cases in which the remedy of damages is inadequate and
specific relief would be expedient.
In the field of specific performance of contract the early vigor
which was shown by the Chancellor in the fifteenth century has not
27
See Walsh, Equity (1930) 198-209.

IS EQUITY DECADENT?

been conspicuous in modern developments. Some progress has
been made by the Uniform Sales Act toward more liberality in
enforcing specific performance of contracts for the sale or purchase
of chattels, but the courts have hindered rather than helped this
development. The extensive and recent development of arbitration contracts and their enforcement has been by legislation made
necessary by weak or mistaken decisions of the courts. Modern
cases, however, have greatly extended specific performance of
contracts to make improvements or to perform affirmative acts of
any kind extending over a considerable period where special reasons exist requiring specific performance instead of the recovery
of damages after performance of the work by another contractor.
Not much remains of the old notion that the Chancellor must
supervise such performance either personally or through a representative.
The doctrine of mutuality of performance and the elimination
of Fry's mistaken notion of mutuality of remedy as essential to
specific performance have been put on a firm and well-reasoned
basis by the later cases. There is still much room for improvement in many states in the law covering performance of conditions in contract express or implied. There can be little doubt
that the doctrine of substantial performance of conditions in contract, now established to a considerable extent at law, originated
in equity.
The refusal of many courts to permit a defaulting purchaser
of land to recover payments made by him though they greatly
exceed any damages resulting, and even though no damages arose
from his breach, is a definite failure of the merged procedure to
accomplish a result which equitable relief against forfeiture clearly demands.
Late cases in several states reject the generally accepted doctrine that the risk of loss falls on the purchaser for losses by fire or
otherwise suffered prior to the closing of the contract, though in
other respects the same courts accept and apply the vendor-purchaser relation doctrine that the vendor holds the title as trustee
for the purchaser and as security for the payment of the purchase
price. Professor Williston's position that the risk of loss falls on
the purchaser in such cases only when there has been a transfer of
possession to. him, has been adopted in the Uniform Purchasers and
Vendors Risk Act, adopted by the Commission in 1935, and enacted substantially in New York as sec. 240a of the Real Property
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Law. There are some practical reasons for this insistence on
change of possession, but no legal principle requires it, and the
cases are strongly against it. The statutory change is a compromise
which in the usual case of non-transfer of possession eliminates
the purchaser's risk of loss, and therefore has the merit of according with the understanding of the average layman.
Law school teachers still disagree as to the basis of the vendorpurchaser relation. Professor Langdell's position that the doctrine
of equitable conversion has no application prior to the date of closing under the contract seems unassailable, but this does not mean
that the implied trust between vendor and purchaser, admittedly
established lalv, is not justified. The implied trust which equity
enforces is based on the intent of the parties that the purchaser
shall become in substance owner of the property in rem, subject
to payment of the price, assuring to him possession and enjoyment
in the future on the" closing of title. The retention of possession
and income by the vendor during the interval is entirely consistent
with this, which effectuates the purchaser's right to specific performance.
On the whole we may fairly say that equity has applied equitable principles in specific performance cases without any loss
arising out of the merger of law and equity; that important progress
to better law considerably extending specific relief has been accomplished under the modern cases.
Statutes have been necessary to establish declaratory judgments, but equity led the way by giving relief of this sort in declaring the existence of equitable mortgages and other liens prior
to their enforcement, in providing for the collection of debts of
a decedent falling due years after his death, and in the construction of wills prior to the carrying out of their provisions. The
entire doctrine of declaratory judgments might have been developed
in equity without the aid of statutes, but the fact that equity cases
pointed the way to this statutory development is anything but evidence of decadence.
In interpleader, equity developed in the early cases much narrow and technical law, most of which has been removed by modern
decisions. Interpleader statutes substituting motions for actions
in these cases have greatly simplified and extended this important
and characteristic form of equitable relief.
We may fairly conclude that modern equity, instead of being
decadent, has tremendously extended its effectiveness as the
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spiritual principle or soul of the law in remedying its shortcomings,
correcting its mistakes and leading in its reform by the establishment of broad principles of social justice under merger of law and
equity. The history of the origin and development of equity and
of its relation to the law is absolutely indispensable to any real
understanding of it. To consider it piecemeal as part of the law
of contract, tort, property, landlord and tenant, and the like is
largely to defeat any real understanding of it and of its relation
to the law. Code merger makes equity far more important than
before. Instead of eliminating equity or converting it into law,
code merger has brought it into the modem legal system freed of
the old restraints, with all its principles and practices unchanged
and unimpaired, and operating directly in all cases. We should
continue to teach equity as a distinct and separate course if we are
to understand its history and its nature. The great danger of
teaching it in a scattered way in the other courses is that the spirit
of equity may be lost in the shuffle and equity rules may be taught
narrowly as so many additional legal rules. This danger of losing
the spirit of equity in applying it as part of the law is the substance of what Dean Pound warned against in the article with
which our discussion opened.

